Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Letters to Remond de Montmort' and 'Ontological Relativity'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
12732 Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
19438 Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
19415 Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
19439 God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz]