10 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |