33 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 22361 | Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |