32 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |