32 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |