31 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |