299 ideas
| 5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
| 5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
| 21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
| 21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
| 16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
| 5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
| 21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
| 21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
| 9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
| 18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
| 9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
| 5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
| 5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
| 5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
| 5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
| 5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
| 5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
| 5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
| 5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
| 18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
| 5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
| 5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
| 5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
| 5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
| 5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
| 22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
| 5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
| 23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
| 5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
| 5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
| 8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
| 16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
| 3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
| 12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
| 2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
| 19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
| 21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
| 5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| 5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
| 5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
| 22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
| 21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
| 5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
| 5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
| 21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
| 7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
| 4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
| 5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
| 5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
| 6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
| 2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
| 5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
| 22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| 5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
| 5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
| 21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
| 5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
| 2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
| 5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
| 5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
| 9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
| 5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
| 5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
| 5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
| 8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
| 21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
| 19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
| 5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
| 5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
| 17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
| 5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
| 5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
| 22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
| 20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
| 20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
| 8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
| 5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
| 5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
| 5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
| 6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
| 5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
| 22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
| 8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
| 5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
| 5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
| 14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
| 9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
| 5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
| 5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
| 19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
| 17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
| 5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
| 5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
| 5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
| 5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
| 5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
| 5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
| 5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
| 8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
| 3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
| 5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
| 5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
| 5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
| 5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
| 5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |