10 ideas
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |