34 ideas
| 10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
| 10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
| 10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
| 10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
| 10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
| 10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
| 10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
| 10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
| 10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
| 10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
| 23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
| 23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
| 23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
| 23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
| 23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
| 23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
| 23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
| 23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
| 23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
| 23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
| 23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
| 23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
| 23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
| 23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
| 23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
| 23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
| 23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
| 23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
| 23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
| 23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
| 23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
| 23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |