11 ideas
| 17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
| 9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |