Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge First (and reply)', 'works' and 'Propositions'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
18086 Weierstrass eliminated talk of infinitesimals [Weierstrass, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
18092 Weierstrass made limits central, but the existence of limits still needed to be proved [Weierstrass, by Bostock]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
19528 Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
19529 Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
19530 A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
19531 Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
19532 Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]