Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects'', 'works' and 'Believing the Axioms I'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
9184 We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
17892 For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
13011 New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
13013 The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy]
13014 Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13021 The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy]
13022 Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
13023 The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13024 Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy]
13025 Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy]
13026 A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
13019 The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
13018 Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
9188 Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10620 Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17883 Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17885 Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
10614 The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9183 Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]