12 ideas
| 17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
| 9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
| 18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
| 18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
| 18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |