Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'Theory of Good and Evil'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]