15 ideas
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |