21 ideas
15510 | Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman] |
9920 | Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen] |
10657 | The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman] |
7956 | If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
7957 | Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
7952 | If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |