35 ideas
| 19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
| 19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
| 19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
| 22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
| 19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
| 22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |