Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6859 Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6334 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
6335 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
6862 Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6858 Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6339 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6860 How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6341 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]