22 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
14248 | We could accept the integers as primitive, then use sets to construct the rest [Cohen] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |