Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge First (and reply)', 'Sets and Numbers' and 'fragments/reports'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17824 The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17825 Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy]
17826 Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy]
17828 Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
17827 Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy]
17830 Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17823 If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
17829 Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
19528 Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
19529 Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
19530 A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
19531 Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
19532 Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
1558 Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus]