Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' and 'Nature's Metaphysics'

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103 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]