48 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 17453 | The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck] |
| 17457 | A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck] |
| 17448 | In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck] |
| 17455 | Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck] |
| 17456 | Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck] |
| 17450 | Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 17451 | We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck] |
| 17459 | Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck] |
| 17454 | Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck] |
| 17458 | Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 17449 | We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |