54 ideas
| 7973 | There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard] |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 7975 | The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard] |
| 7986 | Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard] |
| 7982 | Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 7974 | Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 7987 | Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| 7978 | There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 7980 | In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard] |
| 7983 | Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| 7981 | Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard] |
| 7976 | People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard] |
| 7977 | Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard] |
| 7979 | The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard] |
| 7984 | Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard] |
| 7985 | Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard] |