Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Anti-essentialism' and 'Possible Worlds'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]