9 ideas
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
| 9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
| 3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
| 3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
| 3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |