Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Action' and 'Twilight of the Idols'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


96 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche]
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche]