33 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |