Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed)' and 'Causal Relations'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]