28 ideas
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |