Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Ethics of Ambiguity' and 'On the Infinite'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
12456 I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12461 We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
12462 Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert]
9633 No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert]
12460 We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
12455 The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
12457 There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
12459 The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
18112 Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9636 My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20761 If existence is absurd it can never have a meaning [Beauvoir]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]