43 ideas
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |