Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'What is it like to be a bat?' and 'Sense Data and the Percept Theory'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6859 Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
6862 Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6858 Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6860 How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6493 We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]