Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Russell's Mathematical Logic'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]