Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', 'Model Theory' and 'The Nature of Existence vol.2'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
10476 The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10478 Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10477 |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10474 |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10473 Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
10475 A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
10481 Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
10480 First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15200 How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
14761 Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2608 For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22936 A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
4231 Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
8591 There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22935 The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
7802 A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
4230 A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
15199 The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]