31 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |