33 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |