12 ideas
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
| 1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
| 7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
| 8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
| 8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
| 8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
| 8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
| 8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |