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All the ideas for 'Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects'', 'Sapiens: brief history of humankind' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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76 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari]
For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari]
People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari]
The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari]
The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari]
In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari]
History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari]
Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari]
Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari]
Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari]
Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari]