39 ideas
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
21900 | Deleuze relies on Spinoza (immanence), Bergson (duration), and difference (Nietzsche) [May] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
21898 | For existentialists the present is empty without the pull of the future and weight of the past [May] |
21905 | Liberal theory starts from the governed, not from the governor [May] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |