39 ideas
21900 | Deleuze relies on Spinoza (immanence), Bergson (duration), and difference (Nietzsche) [May] |
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
21898 | For existentialists the present is empty without the pull of the future and weight of the past [May] |
21905 | Liberal theory starts from the governed, not from the governor [May] |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |