Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Objects and Persons', 'fragments/reports' and 'Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction''

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


39 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction theories build mathematics out of second-order equivalence principles [Cook/Ebert]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia]
Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia]
Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia]