Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Ontology', 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld' and 'Apology of Socrates'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz]
Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz]
Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is the greatest of human goods [Xenophon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz]
Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz]