41 ideas
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
| 14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
| 14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
| 14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
| 14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
| 14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
| 14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
| 14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
| 14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
| 14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
| 14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
| 14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
| 14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
| 14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
| 14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
| 14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
| 14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
| 14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
| 14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
| 14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
| 14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
| 6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
| 23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
| 15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
| 4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
| 3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
| 3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
| 20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
| 18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
| 18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
| 20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
| 9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
| 20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
| 21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
| 21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
| 23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
| 14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
| 14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
| 14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
| 14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |