88 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |