Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Ontology', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'Particle Physics'

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48 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR]
The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR]
The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR]
Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR]
The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR]