Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Ontology', 'Chemistry' and 'The Individuation of Events'

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42 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]