Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Ontology', 'The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed)' and 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S]
Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S]
'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S]
It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S]
We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S]
Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S]
The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S]
Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S]
If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S]
It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S]
A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]