Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Objects and Persons', 'talk' and 'Essence and Potentiality'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W]
There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W]
There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W]
..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W]
The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
"My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W]
Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W]