Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Ontology', 'Structure and Nature' and 'The Symposium'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]