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All the ideas for 'Frege on Apriority (with ps)', 'Transworld Heir Lines' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
9065 S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
11970 Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16901 The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
16902 Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064 Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044 If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
9048 The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
9055 The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049 Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
9056 Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
9058 Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
9059 The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
9060 Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050 A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
9061 People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
9062 If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
9063 How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9045 Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
9047 Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
9053 If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
11969 Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11971 The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
16892 Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
11967 Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]